Peace Tax is the term we use to describe the alternative to the current War Tax which we all have to pay - whether we like it or not. Up to 10% of our taxes pay for the military in the UK. In 2003-2004 the UK government will spend £36 billion on the military. This money pays for nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers, battletanks, submarines, cluster-bombs, subsidies to private weapons dealers and pays for all the other requirements of the armed forces. Instead of pouring money into 'false security' this money that could be spent on a whole host of well tried effective peacebuilding initiatives designed to promote a real, lasting and meaningful peace - not simply a gap between wars.
Conscientious objectors refuse, on moral grounds, to take part in war and killing. We believe that conscientious objectors to war should not have to pay for war.
Our case is based on human rights. The right to refuse to perform military service was first recognised in the UK Parliament in 1916. The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is enshrined in the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights. The right to conscientious objection to military service was recognised by the UN in 1987.
Whereas one clearly has the recognised right to refuse to kill someone else one does not have the right to refuse to pay another to do the killing for you. Usually if you pay someone to kill another person you are committing an illegal act - but if you pay a soldier to stab with a bayonet or press fire on a nuclear missile it is legal.
Modern wars are no longer fought with conscript armies, but with high-tech weapons paid for with our taxes. Even before the first shot has been fired, we are already supporting the use of violence. This is financial conscription with no right to object. If the right of conscientious objection is to have any real meaning today, it must be through the right not to support war and preparations for war with our taxes.
The ultimate aim of THE PEACE TAX CAMPAIGN is to achieve a new law establishing the right to a peaceful tax option for those with a conscientious objection to war. The new law will enable conscientious objectors to pay the proportion of their tax that currently funds the military to a Non-Military Security Fund. The fund would be used for conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives, thus enabling conscientious objectors to contribute to security with a clear conscience
A number of bills and motions have already been proposed in Parliament to raise awareness of the issue. Since parliamentary legislation tends to be rather complex, we have produced a 'plain language' version of the legislation we are campaigning for.
registering as a conscientious objector
Any adult on the electoral role should be eligible to register as a conscientious objector. They will register by signing a declaration to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that they have a conscientious objection to paying taxes which finance military expenditure. This declaration could be incorporated into the Inland Revenue Tax Return - our Peace Tax Return is modelled on this idea - and their tax code could be altered accordingly.
calculating payments to the Non-Military Security Fund
For each registered conscientious objector the Inland Revenue would pay into the NMS Fund the average tax payment each voter makes to the Ministry of Defence. This is calculated by dividing the Ministry of Defence budget for the financial year by the number of people on the electoral role.
Thus, the amount of taxes paid into the NMS Fund in a year would be calculated as follows:
MoD budget divided by the no. of voters, multiplied by the no. of registered conscientious objectors.
example
The Ministry of Defence budget for 2002-03 is £**,000 million. The UK has 43.5 million voters. If there were 10,000 Conscientious Tax Objectors the calculation would be:
£**,000 million / 43.5 million X 10,000 = £*,000,000 for the NMS Fund
what the money will be used for
The elected government will be responsible for allocating funds to non-military security programmes of its choosing. The Labour Government established Global and African Conflict Prevention Pools could be one such destination for conscientious objectors' taxes. Funding this vital work is key to building a peaceful future. It removes the need to rely on national security maintained by the threat or use of weapons and provides a more effective and cost-effective security. Such a fund would enable conscientious objectors to make a positive contribution to developing a sustainable, peaceful world. Suggested uses include:
-negotiating and monitoring settlements to conflicts
-restoring communities and the environment in the aftermath of war
-building communication and understanding in areas of potential conflict
-supporting the development of democratic structures, independent media and education for all
-developing international law and peace-keeping structures
-converting industry from military to non-military production
-studying the causes and resolution of conflict
-monitoring and regulating the arms trade
It is no exaggeration to say that the Human Rights Act amounts to one of the most significant constitutional changes in the history of the UK. It has the potential to change the balance of power between individual and state dramatically. For the first time citizens will have directly enforceable rights against public bodies. All public bodies, a term which will be construed widely and will include courts, will have a positive obligation to protect the fundamental political and civil rights of individuals.
The Human Rights Act is a relatively short piece of legislation, its length belying the change which it is set to bring to the constitutional landscape of the UK. Its long title states that its purpose is, amongst other things, "to give further effects to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)." Again, this could be rather misleading when read by itself, suggesting as it does that some "effect" has already been given to those rights and freedoms. Whilst it is true to say that the courts have previously taken notice of the ECHR, our domestic law has never actually given "effect" to it.
The Human Rights Act has been described by a Law Lord as "a carefully and subtly drafted piece of legislation which is designed to preserve the sovereignty of Parliament." It achieves this in a number of ways:
1 - The Act states that certain rights and freedoms which are contained in the ECHR will have effect. These include rights such as those to a fair trial, privacy, respect for family life as well as freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
2 - The Act then requires the courts, when considering an issue which has arisen in connection with one of these rights, to have regard to the law of the European Court of Human Rights, the Commission on Human Rights and decisions of the Council of Europe;
3 - The courts are further required, when interpreting either primary or secondary legislation, to read it and give effect to it in such a way as is compatible with the Convention rights;
4 - If a court finds that domestic law is incompatible with a Convention right or rights, it has the power to make a "declaration of incompatibility." In essence the court will be telling Parliament and the Government that our domestic law is out of step with the ECHR. It will then be for Parliament to change the law so as to remedy the incompatibility, or alternatively, argue that there is in fact no incompatibility and await the resolution of the issue through the courts.
Accordingly, whilst there is a very strong injunction on the courts to interpret legislation in such a way as to make it compatible with the ECHR, it can be seen that there is no power, as exists, for example, in the United States, to actually strike down primary legislation as being unconstitutional. This weakness is probably more apparent than real since the political pressure on any government to amend laws which judges have ruled as being incompatible with the ECHR will be too great to resist in most circumstances.
European jurisprudence
Since the Human Rights Act is new and directly incorporates many rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the natural starting point for discussing how the new legislation will affect conscientious objection is by looking at how the European decision-making bodies have approached the issue.
Any right to conscientious objection would be derived from Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, now of course part of our case law. However, it is important to note that, in common with many of the rights in the Convention, the right is not absolute. Rather, the first part sets out the nature of the right which is protected and then goes on to explain the circumstances in which the right can be restricted.
As the first part of Article 9 (1) makes plain, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion itself is completely protected. The actual right to think or believe in what one wishes is sacrosanct. The Article then goes on to give examples of what this right includes. The right can be exercised either individually or with others and also includes the right to manifest beliefs in various ways.
However, as Article 9 (2) goes on to state, the freedom to manifest beliefs may be limited in certain circumstances. The wording is similar to the limitations which appear in other Articles of the ECHR and established European caselaw makes it apparent that where a state proposes an interference with a fundamental right, such as freedom of conscience, it has the onus of establishing the following matters:
1 - That the proposed interference is non-discriminatory in its impact;
2 - That the proposed interference is prescribed by law, i.e. it is non-arbitrary and capable of being ascertained by the citizen;
3 - That the proposed interference pursues a legitimate aim;
4 - That the means adopted to pursue the legitimate aim is proportionate to the aim which is sought to be achieved.
In general terms, the right to hold the relevant belief is widely construed, as the first clause of Article 9(1) demonstrates. It is accordingly likely that any attempt whatsoever to compel individuals to change their belief system would constitute a violation of Article 9. However, as Article 9(2) makes plain, the manifestation of beliefs can be subject to restrictions on the grounds which are set out. The purpose of this is to enable a balance between the rights of individuals and the collective needs of society as a whole.
There have been a number of cases which have been fought in Strasbourg over the issue of both conscientious objection in general and, more specifically, an objection to paying taxes which go towards military expenditure. In a number of decisions it has consistently been held that Article 9 protects only the manifestation of beliefs in the personal sphere of life as opposed to public life. This has not always been an easy distinction to raw but it is clear to us that a refusal to take part in military service or to pay taxes is a manifestation of personal beliefs. The caselaw has then gone on to say that since tax law is of general application and affects all persons equally, there is no question of it impinging upon the manifestation of beliefs in the personal sphere, tax obligations being a public duty.
The Human Rights Act is not legislation which simply incorporates the ECHR and it is plain that the courts are not required to slavishly follow the European jurisprudence discussed above. It is open to the courts to develop their own brand of human rights law. Indeed, it was made plain by the Lord Chancellor in debates in Parliament during the course of the legislation that it may be right for courts to depart from older Strasbourg caselaw where the rulings do not reflect modern standards of human rights. This is consistent with the well-accepted notion that the ECHR and human rights legislation in general should be construed as a "living instrument" so that meanings can change according to different standards which exist at different stages of societal development.
The jurisprudence which suggests that the refusal to pay tax for military purposes amounts to an expression of belief in the public sphere, and not the personal sphere, is ripe for reconsideration. It is inevitable that those who need to claim the protection provided by the ECHR will do so because the exercise of their private rights has been interfered with in the public sphere. If such an argument is accepted then the focus moves to the question of whether an interference with the refusal to pay tax which goes towards military spending can be justified under Article 9(2).
It would be idle to pretend that these arguments are easy to win. However, as the history of conscientious objection has shown, it takes many battles before the first small victory is won. As the discussion above has hopefully shown, the legal challenges based on the Human Rights Act which will be mounted in the coming months and years should not be seen in isolation. Rather, the rights which we have newly acquired should be seen as part of a larger political picture which, perhaps most importantly, necessitates a willingness on the part of society to learn about and accept the positive aspects of a rights-based culture.
