



Non-military security solutions: peacebuilding alternatives to military responses

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abstract

This report provides insight into, and analysis of, the non-military security solutions utilised by the British government and some British non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It indicates the current British capacities for peacebuilding and presents the diverse and wide-reaching scope of non-military security solutions available to combat conflict and the suffering it causes. The report substantiates that both the government and NGOs maintain strong capacities and expertise in non-military security solutions and finds that the British government has made significant commitments to peacebuilding activities which do not necessarily align with its current allocation of resources to military and non-military approaches. This report hopes to provide an adequate basis for materials and recommendations which may be presented to the public in support of non-military-based peacebuilding, while also serving as a challenge to the current levels and patterns of military spending by the British government.

acronyms

BSOS	Building Stability Overseas (UK)
CAR	Central African Republic
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CRC	Centre Resolution Conflicts (DRC)
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (UN)
DfID	Department for International Development (UK)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FCO	Foreign & Commonwealth Office (UK)
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (Geneva)
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
JPC	Justice and Peace Commission (Uganda)
LRA	The Lord's Resistance Army (Uganda)
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines)
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines)
MoD	Ministry of Defence (UK)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMS	Non-Military Security
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
ODA	Overseas Development Aid
PBI	Peacebuilding Initiative
PDRP	Peace and Development Recovery Plan (Uganda)
PK	Peacekeeping
RCSTF	Regional Civil Society Task Force (Uganda)
RDD	Regional Development Dialogue
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sweden)
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Sweden)
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees



introduction

Violent military conflict continues to have severely devastating consequences for those residing in and around conflict-affected areas throughout the world and remains a key concern for all governments and societies. Intrastate and interstate conflicts of recent years have become increasingly noted for the humanitarian disasters they cause, and as a result, the capacities and possibilities for peace have become a primary point of focus.

Despite the solemn recognition by the majority of governments, including the British, that war is accompanied by devastation and fatalities, the reluctance to ascribe significant resources and commitments to non-military security solutions remains worrying as state resources continue to be channeled into defence and military initiatives in spite of the acknowledgement of what these activities can produce.

In an attempt to challenge military approaches to security, this report informs and provides insight into some of the various non-military security solutions available, particularly at the local/community-based level. Through assessing and evaluating a number of diverse peacebuilding activities utilised by the British government and British NGO's, certain patterns and fundamental concepts are highlighted which appear to be vital to achieving stability and security without the use of military means. As such, the findings of this report aim to aid, support and provide exposure to the development of non-military security solutions, such as those implemented by British organisations and the British government. In addition, the analysis highlights the government's current commitments and indicates ways in which it could contribute more effectively to international peace and security without employing militarised measures.

The key objectives of this report are as follows:

- Identify British organisations and government projects which implement non-military security initiatives in conflict affected regions, with a focus on working alongside local communities and NGOs and/or providing peacebuilding training to them
- Compare and contrast the various approaches of British peacebuilding; assess their differences, similarities, effectiveness and impact, focusing on case studies which illuminate these comparisons best
- Provide insight into vital components of peacebuilding and non-military approaches to security to aid future development

Terminology

While varying definitions may exist for many of the concepts and terms used throughout, the following are attributed for this analysis (definitions are in-house):

Peacebuilding: nonviolent activities to predict, prevent and positively transform violent conflict and deal constructively with its consequences

War: all declared and undeclared armed conflict, whether between states, within states, or between states and non-state actors

Non-military security (NMS): peaceful action to identify, embrace and transform conflicts and prevent their collapse into mass violence, utilising longer-term proactive change in political, social, economic, technological, legal and other spheres through nonviolent short-term approaches to crisis intervention, such as third-party mediation.



methodology

Data collection - peacebuilding organisations

Details of the organisations analysed or referred to throughout this report can be found in Appendix I; however, this should not be considered an exhaustive list of British organisations involved in peace-building.

For the purpose of this report, two key criteria were required for any organisation or project under analysis:

- The peacebuilding organisation must be British-based
- The peacebuilding project must be conducted on a local basis in conflict-affected areas, in collaboration with local NGOs or members of the local community

Upholding these measures ensured that the organisations incorporated had significant experience of peacebuilding 'on the ground' in conflict-affected areas and therefore also possessed a certain degree of expertise and the resources necessary to conduct peacebuilding initiatives (PBIs) in the field. As such, the organisations and projects which fulfilled the criteria provided an indication of the current capacities and approaches of British peacebuilding.

Given this, the subjects of analysis are projects undertaken by British NGOs and charities as well as by a variety of government-initiated PBIs. Projects initiated and/or aided by the British government were included in the analysis in order to incorporate both state and non-state approaches to non-military security solutions.

The preliminary stage of research entailed the examination of a wide array of British organisations and their various approaches to peacebuilding in local contexts throughout the world. Although not all of the organisations and projects which were initially reviewed are directly mentioned here, this first stage of data collection was essential as it indicated the vast array of approaches used by organisations. When these approaches were compared, certain patterns and fundamental values necessary for non-military security solutions became apparent, allowing for greater insight into peacebuilding strategy.

Information regarding the strategies and approaches used by British organisations and the government, as well as details of their PBIs, was gathered primarily through online resources: publications, reports and data available on their respective websites. In some cases, direct correspondence with organisations was also used to clarify or obtain further details on certain peacebuilding projects and approaches.

Case study selection

In order to examine a variety of PBIs and organisational strategies in depth, nine case studies were selected. Each of the case studies details projects which were undertaken in different conflict-affected regions of the world and therefore each embodies a different conflict-background and rationale, as seen in Table I below.

These specific cases were not chosen due to their 'superiority' to other peacebuilding projects, but rather to provide insight and assessment of the broad array of approaches and strategies which can, and are, undertaken by British organisations and the British government. While all the projects have a localised or 'bottom-up' approach, they also incorporate varying scopes of focus - local, national or regional - allowing the analysis to encompass PBIs which operate on a multilateral basis.

A particular asset of the case studies is that they include some indication of impact or degree of result. Although this cannot necessarily be quantified or standardized, the changes evident in the conflict environment within which these projects were placed allowed the organisation to comment on particular areas of progress which followed the implementation of the PBIs.

Table 1. Name, nature and geographical placement of case studies

Organisation Name	Area of operation	Strategy/approach
Conciliation Resources	Uganda	Regional civil society
	Uganda	Justice and reconciliation
	The Philippines	Multilevel peace process
Cord	Chad	Access to basic needs
International Alert	Lebanon	Inter-communal dialogue
Peace Direct	Democratic Republic of Congo	Conflict party engagement
FCO, DfID, MoD	Sudan	Access to basic needs
	Liberia	Vocational training
	Pakistan	Education

Conflict backgrounds and statistical data

Each case study details a specific peacebuilding approach in a particular conflict-affected area. In order to ensure a greater understanding of why these PBIs were implemented, the background of each conflict is provided, as is information on the varying impacts that each conflict has had on the area.

Information regarding conflict backgrounds was collected from a variety of sources, all of which can be seen in full in the references, including most particularly: Human Rights Watch, Insight into Conflict, Amnesty International and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. These sources are considered reliable as they are all highly reputable organisations, commonly known for providing accurate and largely unbiased accounts.

Data concerning the relative impact each conflict has had on the local population and surrounding areas was also included to emphasise the severe consequences conflict has at all levels, as well as to indicate the significant challenge faced by the majority of peacebuilding organisations in these regions. Key impact indicators include: the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), the number of fatalities and the lack of access to basic necessities such as food, clean water, cooking materials and medical assistance. The sources of this data can again be found in full in the references and mainly include: the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, UNHCR, Uppsala Conflict Data Programme and a number of academic reports.

Information derived from the latest reports on global conflict has also been included to provide an overview of how conflict is currently affecting the world and to emphasise the sustained relevance of peacebuilding initiatives. This information was mostly gathered through SIPRI publications.

Limitations

Although the information available on organisation and government websites was generally thorough and varying degrees of correspondence were maintained between parties, information regarding funding and resource allocation proved particularly difficult to come by. While this is understandable given the sensitive nature of such data, it restricted the ability of this report to compare the cost-effect relationship between peacebuilding projects and available resources. Though information regarding organisational funding as a whole was often available, details concerning the resources required, or allocated, to specific PBIs was largely inaccessible. This also inhibited an accurate comparison between the cost-effectiveness of military and non-military approaches to security, except in the case of the British government, where figures were available.

Perhaps the most significant limitation of this report and of the majority of work surrounding both military and non-military approaches to security is the disparity of accurate or standardised methods of measuring impact. Given the volatility and fragility of the subject in question, an accurate gauge of the impact of peacebuilding approaches remains hard to achieve; although a variety of benchmarks exist, they remain somewhat subjective.



Harvesting hope for the future by Unknown

While conflict-related data was not necessarily difficult to acquire due to the number of international bodies, such as the UN, which monitor the various aspects of conflict, the majority of figures remain approximations. This is largely due to the difficulty of accessing many of the conflict-affected regions due to insecurity and restrictions on movement. However, although displacement, fatality and refugee figures often differ slightly from source to source, the variations are rarely that considerable and are obtained from highly reputable bodies and thus should still be considered legitimate.



approaches to
peacebuilding
and non-military
security

Non-governmental approaches

A variety of British NGOs have focused their approaches on expanding local capacities for peace. In many cases this has had wider positive consequences for cooperation at both national and international levels, as 'bottom-up' approaches to peacebuilding essentially attempt to formulate solutions to conflict alongside those most, and directly, affected by it. The basis of this is reflected well in comments by International Alert:

“Peace cannot be made on behalf of people in war-torn and war-threatened territories, but work can be done to equip individuals, organisations and communities with the knowledge and skills that will radically improve their chances of avoiding violence.”¹

NGOs focusing on 'bottom-up' methods often employ varying strategies and approaches, often depending on what the context necessitates. These include:

- Development; infrastructure, education, employment, vocational skills
- Forums for dialogue; inter-ethnic, inter-religious, between ex-belligerents and conflict parties, regional and cross-border communities
- Empowerment; training local leaders, communities and younger generations to encompass the role of peacebuilders
- Multilateral forums; connecting local communities with national decision-makers
- Community-building; reintegration of former combatants and victims to home communities
- Provision of basic necessities; removing the incentive for conflict related to basic human needs
- Trade and business; micro-loans, cross-border trade networks
- Civilian peace-keepers; additional unarmed security presence in vulnerable communities
- Media; multilingual radio programmes which reconnect communities
- Female empowerment; educating and informing women on their role in peacebuilding

As can be seen, the majority of these approaches utilise non-military security strategies based on the enhancement of local capacities; concentrating on structuring community abilities to combat the effects of violence and to provide training and skills which will enable local people to stem and avoid conflict in the future.

Although a considerable number of NGOs propagate the importance of local capacity-building and 'bottom-up' techniques, discrepancies within the sector exist as some organisations instead maintain the use of 'top-down' approaches. 'Top-down' methods are often identifiable in methods undertaken by major international organisations, which focus predominantly on transferring external strategies and external resources into the local sphere. These methods have come under some criticism due to concerns about the lack of local ownership, particularly in terms of sustainability, measures of effectiveness gauged by output rather than outcome, and the role of the organisation as a deliverer of solutions, as opposed to a builder of capacities which would enable locals to formulate their own.²

Government approach

The approach of the British government appears to embody both the 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' strategy to peacebuilding. This is seen most particularly in the joint initiative published by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DfID) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) in July 2011; entitled 'Building Stability Overseas' (BSOS), the document detailed the UK's commitment to peacebuilding and conflict prevention throughout the world. The key strategy undertaken through the initiative is:³

1 Our Work, International Alert, accessed 18 June 2013 at: <http://www.international-alert.org/ourwork>

2 Peace Direct (2013) 'Local First: Concept' accessed 18 June 2013 at: <http://www.localfirst.org.uk/concept/>

3 Department of International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence (2011) 'Building Stability Overseas', p. 18. Accessed 18 June 2013 at: <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/Building-stability-overseas-strategy.pdf> [hereafter referred to as BSOS (2011)]

- **Early warning**
- **Rapid crisis prevention and response**
- **Upstream prevention**

Although central government strategies retain a primary role in a variety of cases, pertaining to 'top-down' methods, **upstream prevention** closely resembles many of the aforementioned 'bottom-up' approaches and was actually formulated alongside peacebuilding organisation, **Saferworld**. Upstream prevention is essentially described as:

'To look at the root causes of conflict and seek to address the underlying factors which contribute to instability before they result in violent conflict.'⁴

Government initiatives have wholeheartedly embraced this approach, pursuing such upstream prevention techniques as: the reintegration of combatants into civilization in Nepal, increasing aid for infrastructure, water and education in Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia and South Sudan, and increasing the engagement of women and remote communities in Sierra Leone and Ethiopia.⁵ In doing so, the British government appears to have fully recognised the advantages and necessity of effective, non-military-based peacebuilding strategies and has committed itself accordingly to developing such strategies in its activities in conflict-affected areas overseas. This is supported in statements from BSOS:

'In the long term, our prosperity and security is intertwined with peaceful development and security across the world'⁶

However, despite the recognition and open acknowledgement of the strengths of non-military security solutions, the government continues to direct only a negligible portion of funding towards peacebuilding projects. This is seen particularly in the disparity of resources between the Conflict Pool, which acts as the primary government funding mechanism for conflict prevention, and the resources provided to military and defence activities. Additionally, a significant proportion of Conflict Pool funding is actually dedicated to 'peacekeeping operations' (PK), which 'artificially inflates the size of the Conflict Pool'⁷. For the fiscal year 2011-12:

- Total managed expenditure was £694,888 million⁸
- **Defence expenditure was £37,683 million⁹**
- The **Conflict Pool was allocated £256 million**, of which £76 million was allocated for peacekeeping overseas, **leaving only £180 million for conflict prevention¹⁰**

Unfortunately, this is not an exceptional event as the Conflict Settlement Fund 2009/10 had a total allocation of **£556 million**, of which **£456 million went to peacekeeping and £100 million went to the Conflict Pool**.¹¹ Ultimately, an additional £71 million was required from the joint departments, as an extra £20 million from the Conflict Pool was dedicated to support stabilization activities in Afghanistan; leaving the final expenditure for peacekeeping at £378 million while the Conflict Pool stood at £180.5 million.¹²

These occurrences highlight significant discrepancies between what the government has committed itself to in policy and the reality of these commitments in the allocation of resources; especially when met with the government's pursuit of military and defence capabilities.

4 Saferworld (13 September 2012) 'Taking an 'upstream' approach to conflict prevention', accessed 18 June 2013 at: <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/news-and-views/comment/54>

5 BSOS (2011), p.25

6 BSOS (2011), p.8

7 National Audit Office (March 2012) 'Review of the Conflict Pool', p.19 (Art. 3.7), accessed 18 June 2013 at: http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/1012/review_of_the_conflict_pool.aspx [hereafter referred to as NAO 2012]

8 HM Treasury (July 2012) Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis 2012, p.19 (Table 1.2), accessed 18 June 2013 at: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pesa_complete_2012.pdf [hereafter referred to as PESA 2012]

9 PESA, p.22-23 (Table 1.4)

10 NAO 2012, p. 5

11 Department of International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence (2011) 'Conflict Pool Annual Report 2009/2010', p. 47, accessed 18 June 2013 at: <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/1/conflict-pool-annual-report.pdf>

12 Ibid.



United Pakistan by Unofficial APP

Designing and measuring peacebuilding projects

In July 2012, CARE International and International Alert published a highly instructive report on the construction and establishment of PBIs. Entitled 'Guidance for monitoring/evaluating the effectiveness of peacebuilding projects' the report sets out detailed guidelines of how to approach the design and implementation of peacebuilding projects. Many of these guidelines align closely with the patterns uncovered in the approaches mentioned previously as well as the subsequent case studies. The report places particular emphasis on conflict analysis and context specification, emphasising the importance of in-depth research into the key factors involved in the conflict and the key causes, in order to ensure that each individual project is suitable to the specific environment it is to be used in, and to be prepared for the challenges that are likely to arise.¹³

A key issue related to peacebuilding and non-military security solutions is the difficulty in measuring the impact of projects. While few definitive models of measurement exist, the joint guidance report offers an insightful recommendation for monitoring effectiveness, arguing that any peacebuilding project is inherently based on a theory of change; that x is likely to change or cause y, and that the evaluation of the success of these theories is likely to determine the effectiveness of the project in question:

"It is more realistic to establish a **logical cause-and-effect chain** that describes an intervention's contribution within a complex system ... By articulating anticipated project results and by making explicit the underlying relationships or theories of change linking the results to each other, we are better able to critically analyse our project design, monitor our implementation progress and evaluate programme results."¹⁴

¹³ CARE International UK (5 July 2012) 'Guidance for designing, monitoring and evaluating peace-building projects: using theories of change', accessed at: <http://www.careinternational.org.uk/research-centre/conflict-and-peacebuilding/227-guidance-for-designing-monitoring-and-evaluating-peacebuilding-projects-using-theories-of-change>

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 7-9



overview of current global conflict

Accurate and effective peacebuilding measures are as needed and as relevant at present as they have been before. The latest reports on global conflict state that during 2011:

- There were 37 armed conflicts, with the most intense seen in North East Africa and the Middle East¹⁵
- Fatalities caused by non-state armed conflict reached over 6,000¹⁶
- One-sided violence initiated against civilians resulted in over 5,000 deaths¹⁷
- UNHCR report that 2011 was the fifth year in a row in which over 42 million people were displaced as a result of violent conflict¹⁸
- Global military spending stood at \$1738 billion¹⁹
- Although peacekeeping operations appeared to have reached a plateau, there appeared to be a rejuvenated application of the principles responsibility to protect (R2P) and protection of civilians (POC), as seen in the international interventions in the Ivory Coast, Libya and Syria²⁰
- Although the number of recurring intrastate conflicts has decreased since 1999, over 45 intrastate conflicts have reoccurred after a short interruption in hostilities²¹
- Between 2000-2004, 60% of intrastate wars reoccurred within 5 years of their initial termination²²

As can be seen, violent conflict and its effects remain a serious cause for concern and affect tens of millions of people on an annual basis, with a high number of only temporary terminations. In light of this, the following case studies hope to indicate the numerous approaches and projects implemented to combat the effects of armed conflict and provide sustainable solutions for peace.

15 Themnér, Lotta & Wallensteen, Peter (2012) 'Armed Conflict, 1946-2011', *Journal of Peace Research* 49(4), accessed 19 June 2013 at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/125/125674_armedconflicts_2011.pdf

16 Eck, Kristine, Kreutz, Joakim and Sundberg, Ralph (2012) 'UCDP Non-state Conflict Dataset v. 2.4-2012 1989-2011', "Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset", *Journal of Peace Research*, March 2012, 49:351-362 accessed 19 June 2013 at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/122/122568_non_state_fatalities_2011.pdf

17 Eck, Kristine and Hultman, Lisa (2007) 'UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset v 1.4-2012, 1989-2011', "Violence Against Civilians in War." *Journal of Peace Research*, 44(2), accessed 19 June 2013 at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/122/122572_one-sided_fatalities_2011.pdf

18 UNHCR (2011) 'UNHCR Global Trends 2011: A Year of Crises', p. 3, accessed 19 June 2013 at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4fd6f87f9.html>

19 SIPRI (2012) 'SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Military Expenditure', accessed 19 June 2013 at: <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2012/04>

20 SIPRI (2012) 'SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Peace Operations and Conflict Management', accessed 19 June 2013 at: <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2012/03>

21 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2012) 'Figures for the Human Security Report 2012' in Human Security Report 2012: Sexual Violence, Education, and War: Beyond the Narrative', Fig. 6.2, accessed 19 June 2013 at: http://hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR2012/Figures/2012Report_Fig_6_2_NewRecurringIntra.pdf [hereafter referred to as UCDP 2012]

22 UCDP 2012, Fig 6.3, accessed 19 June 2013 at: http://hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR2012/Figures/2012Report_Fig_6_3_RateRecurrenceIntra.pdf



case studies

Background

Following a series of oppressive government policies towards the Acholi people of Northern Uganda in the 1980s, a rebel movement named The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) formed in opposition to the government.²³ Following numerous clashes with government forces, the LRA, headed by Joseph Kony, was eventually expelled from Uganda and is currently dispersed throughout bordering regions and the neighbouring countries of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan.²⁴ Although initially popular amongst the Ugandan public, the LRA quickly lost support as it became infamous for its tactics of abduction, the use of child soldiers, policies of disfigurement and torture, as well as a host of vicious attacks on populations in the areas they operate within.²⁵

Impact

- Between 1997 and 2007 approximately 100,000 Ugandans died as a result of the conflict²⁶
- Between 1987 and 2006 at least 20,000 Ugandan children were abducted²⁷
- **More than 1.9 million people were internally displaced and placed in camps where tens of thousands have died as a result of poor conditions and widespread diseases, including cholera. Poor conditions have led to death tolls which are higher than those of the actual conflict**²⁸
- Due to LRA infiltration, over 40,000 people have been displaced from their homes in neighbouring states of South Sudan, CAR and DRC²⁹

Regional Civil Society Task Force (RCSTF)

Civil societies across the conflict-affected regions have become increasingly united through their shared experiences, resulting in the formation of the RCSTF. The task force consists of a network of religious, cultural and civil representatives from NGOs originating in the four affected countries, **brought together by conciliation resources**, to increase inter-communal communication and the ability to formulate solutions to the numerous common challenges they face.

The effectiveness of the civil approach taken by the RCSTF is highlighted by successes in **community reintegration** projects focused on returning abductees and former LRA soldiers to Northern Uganda. By adopting traditional means of conflict resolution such as the Mato Oput justice process, the RCSTF is able to facilitate the reconciliation of former LRA fighters and reintegrate them into their communities. In recognizing the weakness of military campaigns, the task force has attempted to construct dialogues with members of the LRA and LRA leadership, hoping to **engage with them directly through civil dialogue rather than violence**.

Conciliation Resources

"What can people do that governments cannot? One thing governments cannot do is to convince returning LRA fighters that **they are accepted back** and say: "We are ready to reconcile with you, you are still our children." ... This is the power of civil society"³⁰

23 War Child 'The Lord's Resistance Army', accessed at: http://www.warchild.org.uk/issues/the-lords-resistance-army?_kk=lord%20resistance%20army&_kt=a35dea99-cfb1-4fd9-8cb8-847c2ecd7db8&gclid=CjQX8eSo8rQCFTDMtAodogwAnw

24 Human Rights Watch (21 March 2012) 'Q & A on Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army', accessed at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/21/qa-joseph-kony-and-lords-resistance-army#5> [Hereafter referred to as HRW 21 March 2012 Q & A on Joseph Kony and the LRA]

25 Insight on Conflict 'Uganda Conflict Profile', accessed at: <http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/uganda/conflict-profile/>

26 The Resolve: LRA Crisis Initiative 'Key Statistics', accessed at: <http://theresolve.org/key-statistics>

27 HRW 21 March 2012 Q & A on Joseph Kony and the LRA

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ramsbotham, Alexander and Zartmen, William (Eds.) (2011) 'Accord 22: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, Paix Sans Frontières: building peace across borders', *Conciliation Resources*, p. 57

Justice and Peace Commission (JPC Gulu)

With support from DfID's Governance and Transparency Fund, Conciliation Resources has worked alongside JPC Gulu in Northern Uganda to deliver training to civil society which will **enable them to monitor the implementation of the Ugandan peace plan**. By empowering local communities with the knowledge of their rights set out by the government in its Peace, Development and Recovery Plan (PDRP), JPC Gulu helps to ensure the accountability and the delivery of government promises.

JPC Gulu has also taken action to ease the return of IDPs. **The Commission has trained paralegals** in their communities to resolve disputes relating to land conflicts; ensuring that adequate resources are available to mitigate problems which are likely to arise in post-conflict situations, undermining the deference to violence. JPC Gulu also works on **reconciliation**, addressing inter-community fear and mistrust that has maintained ethnic divisions in Uganda for decades.

Multilateral peace processes in Mindanao, The Philippines

Conciliation Resources

Background

Armed groups originating from the predominantly Muslim-populated region of Mindanao in the Southern Philippines have engaged in conflict with the Philippine government since the 1960s, largely in the pursuit of self-determination, regional autonomy and the creation of a 'Moro Homeland'.³¹ Peace processes between the government and armed factions such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) were regularly breached throughout the 1970s, resulting in the deaths of thousands of civilians caught in the crossfire. In 1996, the government finally signed a peace agreement with MNLF and a variety of other groups; however, violence has continued between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), who are calling for an independent Islamic state.³² The last fifteen years have seen consistent efforts towards peace talks, which have continuously broken down in the face of sustained violence. This has been undermined further by increasing numbers of break-away factions of the MILF which have taken up their own causes against the government.³³

Impact

- The 50-year duration of the conflict has resulted in the deaths of approximately 150,000 people³⁴
- Since 2000, nearly 3 million people have been internally displaced³⁵

Bantay ceasefire and the International Contact Group

Conciliation Resources has pursued a multilevel dialogue to combine the perspectives of grass roots activists, civil society organisations and the political elite to engage all the parties involved and affected by the long-drawn conflict.

The extensive multilateral approach adopted by Conciliation Resources and related partners has led to intense engagement between MILF, civil society and the Philippine government, developing some of **the most refined inter-religious dialogue initiatives in the world**. Grass roots projects include the Bantay ceasefire initiative, a process of civilian monitoring led by people living in the conflict-affected communities. Higher-level approaches

31 HURIGHTS OSAKA (December 2008) 'Focus: Mindanao Conflict: In Search of Peace and Human Rights', Asia-Pacific Human Rights Center, 54, accessed at: <http://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/focus/section2/2008/12/mindanao-conflict-in-search-of-peace-and-human-rights.html#n4>

32 Ibid.

33 AlertNet (29 October 2012) 'Philippines-Mindanao Conflict', accessed at: <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/crisis-centre/crisis/philippines-mindanao-conflict#detail-section4>

34 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 'Philippines: Durable Solution Out of Sight for Many IDPs and Returnees in Mindanao', accessed at: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/FB34FE99F089E9C6802570A7004BF2DF?OpenDocument&expand=2&link=38.2&count=10000#38.2](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/FB34FE99F089E9C6802570A7004BF2DF?OpenDocument&expand=2&link=38.2&count=10000#38.2)

35 Ibid.

include the use of the **International Contact Group, the only mediation group in the world in which international NGOs work alongside the parties to support peace talks.** The huge success of these initiatives is evident in the signing of a peace accord on 7 October 2012, the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.

Conciliation Resources

“The key to successful implementation now will be local ownership ... inclusive, cross-sector public participation in the process must be maintained. **Civil society, religious leaders, media, the business and the security sector all have a key role to play in securing a sustainable peace.**”³⁶

‘Cooking up peace’ in Chad

Cord

Background

Tensions in the Eastern region of Chad are a product of both internal and external conflicts which have resulted in mass population displacements and the formation of numerous refugee camps along the Sudan-Chad border. The conflict in neighbouring Sudan caused a mass exodus of Sudanese civilians across the border into Chad. At the same time, Chad remains affected by internal conflicts between the state and Sudanese-supported rebel forces, many of whom have existed since the Chadian civil war which ravaged the country from 2005-2010, provoking mass migrations of conflict-affected civilians.³⁷ The fragility of the situation has also been exacerbated by increasing instances of interethnic fighting, competition over scarce national resources and the massing of refugees and militias along the Sudan-Chad border.³⁸

Impact

- Currently over 280,000 Sudanese refugees reside in Chad³⁹
- 90,000 Chadian people remain internally displaced⁴⁰

Solar cookers strengthen communities

Many of the intra- and inter-communal disputes and much of the violence occur due to the need for limited resources, most especially firewood, which increases strains on both Sudanese and Chadian populations. **Cord** has approached the underlying conflicts of many communities living in refugee camps with particular innovation; **introducing the use of solar cookers to mitigate competition over firewood for cooking and heating.** Not only has this helped to dispel one of the most common conflicts that affect communities, but it also decreases the risk posed to many women who are often victims of attacks when travelling to collect firewood. In addition, having resources immediately available has allowed many children, particularly girls, to return to school and receive an education.

This project has provided an innovative and relatively sustainable solution to a significant problem affecting many in refugee camps. Additionally, **confidence and collaboration within communities has increased considerably** since the introduction of this scheme as, once the materials are supplied, the refugees themselves assemble the cookers; the scheme therefore provides active and collective roles within the community.

36 Conciliation Resources (7 October 2012) ‘Historic agreement paves way to peace in Mindanao: The Philippines Lead on Innovative Ways of Peacemaking’, accessed at: <http://www.c-r.org/resources/historic-agreement-paves-way-peace-mindanao>

37 Human Rights Watch (26 April 2008) ‘Q & A Crisis in Darfur’, accessed at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/25/q-crisis-darfur>

38 IDMC ‘Chad: Improvements in security allow for the return of some IDPs’, accessed at: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/69BB2800A93D1374C12571560029544F?OpenDocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/69BB2800A93D1374C12571560029544F?OpenDocument)

39 UNHCR ‘Chad: 2013 UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Chad’, accessed at: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c226&submit=GO>

40 IDMC ‘Chad: Improvements in security allow for the return of some IDPs’, accessed at: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/69BB2800A93D1374C12571560029544F?OpenDocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/69BB2800A93D1374C12571560029544F?OpenDocument)

“Local ownership of the production process is essential for the long-term success of the solar cookers and ensures the skills and knowledge remain within the community.”⁴¹

Encouraging young people to lead in Lebanon

International Alert

Background

The assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005 sparked the most recent bout of violence in Lebanon's turbulent history. It provoked mass reprisals against Syrian occupation, which were closely followed by increased hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel, leading to war in 2006.⁴² The subsequent year witnessed increasing levels of violence between the Lebanese Army and Fatah al-Islam (a Palestinian armed group) which led to large-scale destruction of Nahr al-Bared, a Palestinian refugee camp, resulting in mass internal displacement of thousands of Palestinians.⁴³ Tensions continued to escalate over the following years between the Lebanese government, Hezbollah and other political parties, leading to political violence. However, an agreement was eventually entered into in May 2008 which brought an end to much of the violence but provided little foundation for a political solution. Political paralysis between the sectarian groups remains an impediment to the strengthening of effective state institutions which would serve to stabilize the state and sustain peace in the future.

Impact

- Although no internally displaced people remain from the 2006 war, 47,000 IDPS still exist as a result of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990)⁴⁴
- 27,000 Palestinian refugees remain displaced due to the destruction of settlements during the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon⁴⁵
- Over 15,000 Lebanese refugees remain as a result of continuing conflict⁴⁶
- Conflict of the recent years led to the deaths of 1,109 Lebanese, the majority of whom were civilian⁴⁷
- Overall fatalities from conflict over the past decades approximate to over 130,000⁴⁸

Inter-community communication

In 2009, **International Alert** established a project to bring together youth representatives from nineteen of Lebanon's key political parties in an attempt to build communication across the various sectarian branches of Lebanese society; most particularly the Shia, Sunni and Maronite sections of society. The aim of the project is essentially to **build and enhance the capacities of the youth wings to address key issues which affect Lebanon**; encouraging them to be more open to alternative perspectives, gradually achieving the ability to lead change in democratic ways and maintain dialogue across the sectarian boundaries of their political landscape. In the long term it will allow the next generation of political leaders to represent constituencies more effectively and to collaborate on important issues which often go unresolved due to the divided nature of the Lebanese political system; this in turn,

41 CORD 'Solar Cooker Project in Chad is in Full Swing', accessed at: <http://www.cord.org.uk/the-latest/latest-news/cord-latest/chad-latest-news/562-solar-cooker-assembly.html>

42 Amnesty International (2008) 'Lebanon: Amnesty International Report 2007', accessed at: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/lebanon/report-2007>

43 Amnesty International (2009) 'Lebanon: Amnesty International Report 2008', accessed at: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/lebanon/report-2008>

44 MC 'LEBANON: No new displacement but causes of past conflicts unresolved', accessed at: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/99D28A56726B48B9802570A7004CCFD8?OpenDocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/99D28A56726B48B9802570A7004CCFD8?OpenDocument)

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Human Rights Watch (6 September 2007) 'Why They Died', accessed at: <http://www.hrw.org/node/10734/section/5>

48 Leitenberg, Milton (2006) 'Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century', Cornell University Peace Studies Programme, Ed. 3, p. 74, accessed at: <http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/deathswarsconflictsjune52006.pdf> [Hereon referred to as: Leitenberg, Milton (2006)]

due to its current weaknesses, leads to significant elements of tension and conflict within Lebanese society.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Peace Direct with Centre Résolution Conflits (CRC)

Background

The current situation in the DRC was sparked by the invasion of Rwandan and Ugandan forces in 1996 which toppled long-standing leader Mobutu Sese Seko and installed Laurent Kabila. Kabila gradually lost popularity with his foreign allies and in 1998 Congolese rebels supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi attacked state forces and took control of eastern Congo. However, Kabila retained support from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe and proceeded to occupy the west of the country.⁴⁹ Although a peace agreement was signed in 1999, hostilities have continued, largely due to the presence of militias and foreign armed groups. Following Kabila's assassination in 2001, his son Joseph Kabila succeeded as leader. Although he appears to be more committed to the peace process than his father, high levels of insecurity remain, particularly in eastern parts of the DRC which are rich in natural resources.⁵⁰ The DRC has also been strongly affected by conflicts in neighbouring countries; following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, huge numbers of Hutu refugees arrived in DRC, displacing Congolese Tutsi and fuelling interethnic conflicts which had historically plagued the region.⁵¹

Impact

- Civil war (1998-2000) resulted in 1.5 million deaths⁵² and 2.4million IDP⁵³
- Recent attacks on Goma in 2012 resulted in a further 140,000 people internally displaced, while over 50,000 refugees have fled camps due to escalating levels of violence.⁵⁴

Community-led DDR

Since 2008, the CRC has carried out a number of crucial projects in North Kivu, Eastern DRC, most particularly concerning community-led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). CRC has adopted approaches which **involve direct engagement with the militias in order to encourage and aid them to disarm, whilst also leading negotiations for the safe return of child soldiers and the reintegration-process once children are returned to their homes**. CRC's approach is particularly innovative as it utilises a Regional Development Dialogue RDD approach: placing reintegration at the forefront of the process and establishing 'co-operatives' which bring civilians and ex-combatants together. The success of this approach has been particularly highlighted by the 4,276 ex-combatants who were disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated due to the CRC's assistive process.

The effectiveness of CRC's strategies is particularly evident in the fact that **only 10% of former combatants engaged with the CRC stated they would consider returning to the bush, compared to around 60% of those who had not engaged with the CRC process**. CRC engagement also significantly enhanced ex-combatant relations with their communities, with around **96% of those involved in the CRC process belonging to a community group, as opposed to 0% of those not engaged with the CRC**.

CRC has also set up 'task forces' composed of former militia, army personnel, civilian leaders and influential community

49 IDMC (21 December 2010) 'Democratic Republic of the Congo: Historical Background (1992-2006)', accessed at: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/\(httpEnvelopes\)/3A1E5654B536EFA3C12577FB006FE862?OpenDocument#15.2.1](http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/3A1E5654B536EFA3C12577FB006FE862?OpenDocument#15.2.1)

50 Breau, Susan (2006) 'The Impact of the Responsibility to Protect on Peacekeeping', *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 11.3, p. 447

51 IDMC (21 December 2010) 'Democratic Republic of the Congo: Historical Background (1992-2006)', accessed at: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/\(httpEnvelopes\)/3A1E5654B536EFA3C12577FB006FE862?OpenDocument#15.2.1](http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/3A1E5654B536EFA3C12577FB006FE862?OpenDocument#15.2.1)

52 Leitenberg, Milton (2006) p.78

53 IDMC 'DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: IDPs need further assistance in context of continued attacks and insecurity', accessed at: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/554559DA500C8588802570A7004A96C7?OpenDocument&expand=2.1&link=15.2.1&count=10000#15.2.1](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/554559DA500C8588802570A7004A96C7?OpenDocument&expand=2.1&link=15.2.1&count=10000#15.2.1)

54 Ibid.

leaders. These **task forces have succeeded in numerous negotiations with local militias to protect local populations and last year secured the release of 444 child soldiers and encouraged 1,334 adults to leave rebel movements.** The CRC has also greatly harnessed the use of local radio to communicate with those still in the bush, establishing over 150 radio programmes designed to encourage combatants to leave armed groups.

Additionally, CRC has utilised multilevel methods to alleviate tensions between various parties; mediating conflicts between UN peacekeepers and local militias, intervening in intensive interethnic fighting in refugee camps and establishing peace committees in villages bringing together local leaders, religious leaders, the UN and security services.

Henri Ladyi, local peace-builder

“I grew up in war and like many boys from my community I thought about joining the local militia to protect my family”⁵⁵

Growing our own peace: peacebuilding initiatives of DfID, FCO and MOD

British Government

Sudan Background

Sudan has experienced varying degrees of civil war for the past five decades. In 2011, South Sudan declared independence, exacerbating tensions in the ‘three areas’ along the Sudan-South Sudan border. The status of oil-rich Abyei remains largely undetermined while the states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile continue to experience high levels of violence as conflict continues between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) of the north and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) of the south.⁵⁶ In addition, the population of Darfur in West Sudan has suffered extensively since 2003 as a result of the government and ‘Janjaweed’ militia-led armed response against the rebel Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) forces originating in the area.⁵⁷ Rebel attacks led to intensive government bombing campaigns and ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region which has become infamous for its humanitarian devastation.

Impact

- UN estimates place the estimated death toll in Darfur at approximately 300,000 in 2010⁵⁸
- Internal displacement figures from Darfur currently stand at 1.9 million, accounting for a large proportion of 2.2 million IDPs in Sudan⁵⁹
- 500,000 Sudanese refugees, the majority dwelling in neighbouring states⁶⁰
- North-South conflict has resulted in approximately 2 million deaths⁶¹

Peace through water

As with many countries in Africa, the **accessibility of clean water is often a key concern** to many communities, and the difficulties of water provision are largely exacerbated in conflict-affected regions.

55 Peace Direct ‘Centre Résolution Conflits, DR Congo’, accessed at: <http://www.peacedirect.org/peacebuilders/drcongo/>

56 Ibid.

57 Human Rights Watch (26 April 2008) ‘Q & A Crisis in Darfur’, accessed at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/25/q-crisis-darfur>

58 BBC News (7 June 2010) ‘Darfur death toll rises to two-year high in Sudan’, accessed at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10259604>

59 IDMC ‘Sudan: Durable solutions elusive as Southern IDPs return and Darfur remains tense’, accessed at: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/F3D3CAA7CBEBE276802570A7004B87E4?OpenDocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/F3D3CAA7CBEBE276802570A7004B87E4?OpenDocument)

60 Ibid.

61 CIA ‘The World Factbook: Sudan’, accessed at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html>



Oliva Noalla, 6, with her younger sister on her back, Mugunga camp, DRC by Oxfam International

The **British Conflict Pool funds over 43 water projects in Sudan**; arranged through community organisations, the projects provide tools and training for local communities enabling them to build and maintain boreholes and water pumps. The projects also establish 'water committees' within communities to ensure coordinated responsibilities and upkeep for village water sources. Water scarcity during times of conflicts heightens tensions within and between communities and can often fuel the fierce conflict which has already ravaged the region. In supplying a sustainable solution to the most basic of human necessities, the water projects in Sudan remove this factor of conflict.

Liberia Background

In 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor initiated an uprising against the Liberian government, resulting in the assassination of leader Samuel Doe, who had previously taken power through a military coup in 1980. Civil war broke out in 1990, as the NPFL and various armed groups competed for power, prompting the deployment of a Nigerian-led peacekeeping force sent by ECOWAS.⁶² Following a ceasefire, Charles Taylor was elected as President in 1997. However, sustained ethnic tensions eventually led to a second civil war in 1999 between Liberians for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and forces loyal to President Taylor.⁶³ The conflict finally ended in 2003, when the parties signed the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Charles Taylor stepped down. In April 2012, Charles Taylor became the first former head-of-state in Africa to be convicted of war crimes, due to his role in the atrocities committed during the conflict in Sierra Leone.⁶⁴

⁶² Insight on Conflict 'Liberia: Conflict Profile', accessed at: <http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/liberia/conflict-profile/>

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Aljazeera (27 April 2012) 'War Crimes Court Finds Charles Taylor Guilty', accessed at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/201242693846498785.html>

Impact

- UNDP estimates the total deaths to be over 200,000 for the total duration of the civil war⁶⁵
- The number of IDPs is unknown as there has been little follow-up on the refugees who remained in camps following the end of the war, although up to 500,000 are believed to have been internally displaced by the war⁶⁶

Agricultural projects and soldier reintegration

Landmine Action's Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme (TATP) has adopted an innovative approach to the **reintegration of combatants from the civil war**, focusing particularly on those who were not incorporated into the official reintegration scheme under the Liberian government. Ex-combatants complete a residential training programme which not only provides them with psychological counselling to aid their assimilation into communities and civilian life, but it also provides vocational skills training in agriculture, literacy and numeracy. An essential component of this project is the support which is provided after the training is complete and ex-combatants return to their communities. **Each member is supplied with the materials and tools necessary to plant crops or set up animal pens and is visited by TATP staff a few weeks after they have returned to their communities.**

Between 2008 and 2010 over 1,050 trainees graduated from the programme and re-joined their communities. The specialist agricultural knowledge and peacebuilding skills provided by the project has allowed a highly successful and in many ways original approach to reintegration in Liberia. Some graduates have even gone on to form agricultural collectives, such as 'Help Fight Against Hunger in Liberia' (HFAHL), while many others have been greatly successful in their farming aims and have managed to train other ex-combatants, furthering this effective formula for reintegration.

Pakistan Background

Since 2001 conflicts have raged in the North-West regions between Islamic insurgency groups affiliated to the Taliban Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and State Security Forces (SSF). Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Pashtu-dominated region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) have been most affected, and the situation has worsened since 2007, due to increasing numbers of armed groups in the area demanding regional autonomy.⁶⁷ The province of Baluchistan has also experienced violence between armed groups and state government forces concerning the distribution of profits gained from natural resources extracted from the area.⁶⁸ Additionally, traditional tensions between Muslim communities have been exacerbated as a result of the recent influx of Afghan refugees and financing from foreign governments in support for Sunni and Shia communities.⁶⁹ The increasing radicalization of Islamic groups has led to frequent inter-communal bombings, shootings and assassinations.⁷⁰

65 UNDP 'Microproject Support for Resettlement and Reintegration'. Accessed at: <http://mirror.undp.org/liberia/unops.htm>

66 IDMC 'LIBERIA: Focus for IDP returnees moves from conflict to development', accessed at: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/78D50A458CC54720802570A7004B5690?OpenDocument&expand=1.1&link=30.1.1&count=10000#30.1.1](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/78D50A458CC54720802570A7004B5690?OpenDocument&expand=1.1&link=30.1.1&count=10000#30.1.1)

67 IDMC 'PAKISTAN: Displacement caused by conflict and natural disasters, achievements and challenges, accessed at: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/D927619B0A8659BB802570A7004BDA56?OpenDocument&expand=1.1&link=36.1.1&count=10000#36.1.1](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/D927619B0A8659BB802570A7004BDA56?OpenDocument&expand=1.1&link=36.1.1&count=10000#36.1.1)

68 Insight on Conflict 'Pakistan: Country Profile', Accessed at: <http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/pakistan/conflict-profile/>

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

Impact

- 850,000 remain displaced from the FATA provinces and over 33,000 refugees exist in total⁷¹
- The South Asia Terrorism Portal's last assessment of Pakistan states that during 2011, 4,447 people were killed in terrorist attacks and a total of 6412 died as a result of Islamic extremism⁷²
- From 2009 to January 2013, the total number of deaths in the FATA province was 16,500⁷³
- From 2005-2012, the total number of deaths in KPK stands at 11,862⁷⁴

Retelling history and removing barriers to peace

The weakness of the Pakistani education system has often been deemed responsible for radicalization and the foundations for future conflict, as the lack of modern resources and teachers has led to poor and inaccurate education, particularly in the country's past. This has perpetuated misperceptions of others within the country as well as those in countries neighbouring it, especially India. This in turn, sustains suspicion and sources of tension within the state, which in many cases have maintained feelings of hatred, and thus the propensity to conflict. The Conflict Pool has funded the **Citizens' Archive of Pakistan**, a small project in Karachi which aims at utilizing modern methods and technologies to **provide historical education to children from low-income areas**. Amongst other aims, the project encourages critical thinking, whilst providing a **more accurate and inclusive concept of the country's history, helping both children and teachers alike**.

The success of the project, which is mainly run by local volunteers, has gained increasing precedence in Karachi and is likely to be the basis for educational reform, therefore allowing the next generation to be properly informed of their nation's history and dispelling traditional prejudices and beliefs which have inhibited peace-building in the past. In addition, the next step of the project has focused on **partnerships between Pakistani and Indian schools**, which will allow students to study the history of the two countries and therefore dissipate many of the misunderstandings and tensions that are often maintained between the two nations. This approach instigates a more cooperative framework for the two countries in the future as their leaders will have more thorough and less biased interpretations.

71 IDMC 'PAKISTAN: Displacement caused by conflict and natural disasters, achievements and challenges, accessed at: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/D927619B0A8659BB802570A7004BDA56?OpenDocument&expand=1.1&link=36.1.1&count=10000#36.1.1](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/D927619B0A8659BB802570A7004BDA56?OpenDocument&expand=1.1&link=36.1.1&count=10000#36.1.1)

72 South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) 'Pakistan Assessment 2012', accessed at: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/>

73 Mohanty, Tushar R (7 January 2013) 'Pakistan FATA: Festering Wounds', South Asia Intelligence Review, 11 (27), accessed at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair11/11_27.htm#assessment1

74 Mohanty, Tushar R. (24 December 2012) 'Pakistan: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Unending Bloodbath', South Asia Intelligence Review, 11 (27), accessed at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair11/11_25.htm#assessment1



analysis

The case studies included above offer a diverse and thorough indication of the variety of non-military security solutions which are implemented in conflict and post-conflict environments. While the organisations and projects adopt different approaches, significant patterns exist and act as indications of vital components for peacebuilding, as detailed below.

- **Context-specific approaches;** whether localized, state-led or externally initiated, projects should be designed according to the specific nature of the conflict. Although broad theories may be applicable, peacebuilding activities are rarely directly transferable between conflict situations, and thus each case requires thorough research and understanding of appropriate responses. For example, initiating reforms to education or attempting to improve links between communities may be futile if communities have not undergone an effective strategy of internal DDR.
- **Cultural relevance;** peace-building approaches must be designed to comply with the cultural rules and norms of the environment, which in turn can also be utilized to facilitate cooperation. This is evident in the work of RCSTF and their use of the Mato Oput justice process, which has eased the reintegration of many soldiers in a way that is unlikely to have been implemented purely on the basis of third-party intervention. This emphasises the advantages of approaching activities from a local perspective and of using local experience of what is likely to succeed and what will be acceptable due to the cultural practices and beliefs of communities.
- **Neutrality** (practised and perceived); functioning successfully and safely in a conflict-affected region, particularly between belligerents, requires succinct neutrality when working with the parties. For example, had the mediators involved in the signing of the peace accord between the MILF and the Philippine government shown partiality, this would have greatly inhibited the trust and willingness of either of the parties to continue in negotiations. International and local peacebuilders must be sure to reaffirm the neutrality of their organisation, ensuring they do not exacerbate situations on the ground by prioritising the needs of some above the needs of others.
- **Engagement through dialogue;** the majority of the case studies emphasise the importance of inclusive dialogue in building sustainable peace. Ensuring that all affected parties participate enables peace processes to incorporate grievances on a multitude of levels, seen most successfully in the multilateral dialogues initiated during the Philippine peace process. This need not be restricted to the engagement of local parties alone, as shown by the work of the RCSTF in Northern Uganda, which engaged directly with the LRA and former combatants in areas throughout the region. Additionally, the use of multilateral dialogue which does not focus predominantly on the leaders of communities can also be effective in opening alternative pathways of communication, as seen in the engagement of political youth wings in Lebanon. While the focus on grass-roots engagement remains essential, the importance of state responses should not be underestimated nor ignored: had the Ugandan government not committed itself to an official peace plan it is unlikely that the population would have been able to renew its confidence in the state, which in turn would have inhibited reconciliation and peace.
- **Education;** from the most basic skills of numeracy and literacy to vocational skills in farming and the use of accurate accounts of history, education is one of the strongest tools available to apply wide-scale, multi-level and long-term transformational capacities. The ability of education to alter public and inter-ethnic prejudices, national identities, and even to introduce concepts and methods of peace-building and mediation to the wider population, makes it one of the most powerful tools in conflict resolution, reaffirming traditional claims that 'the destiny of the nation is created in the class room'.
- **Conflict transformation vs. conflict ending;** a key delineation between military approaches to conflict and non-military approaches is represented by the fact that the former is based predominantly on ending conflict, while the latter essentially seeks not just to end hostilities, but to transform the foundation of the conflict. This is evident in the approaches of a number of projects which attempt to move forward from the circumstances which provoked conflicts initially; through ex-belligerent engagement and reintegration, accurate historical education of cross-cultural relations and attempts to ensure that the next generation of society is not as divided as the current one. Although military approaches may indeed be able to bring an end to conflict, non-military security appears to focus on ensuring that the end of conflict is sustainable.

- **Basic provision;** many of the approaches highlighted above are highly innovative and yet apply to the most basic provisions such as water accessibility, cooking facilities and a channel for basic communication between communities. All of the case studies indicate the impact of each conflict and the drastic humanitarian consequences it had for communities, which in the majority of cases can restrict their access to the basic human necessities and further fuel conflict. Provision of the means to make basic needs accessible can create an almost automatic solution to some of these key issues.

Advantages of non-military security approaches

Evidence that peace-building projects contribute positively to conflict-affected environments and communities can be seen throughout the case studies that have been provided here - the details of which indicate significant aspects of progress, whether in terms of securing the release of child soldiers through active dialogue with belligerents in the DRC, empowering and reintegrating ex-combatants in Liberia and Northern Uganda, or formulating a multilateral dialogue between governments and rebels which results in a peace accord, such as in the Philippines. While these contributions cannot be specifically quantified and may well be susceptible to the longevity of conflict and its consequences, the positive results that these projects have produced should inspire confidence in the processes and ideals involved in non-military security.

This is perhaps even more pertinent in cases of grass-roots projects, as the involvement of local communities appears to be essential to building peace, particularly a sustainable one. The case of the CRC in the DRC exemplifies this well, as building the capacities of local people allows them ultimately to lead peace-building with a local perspective, increasing the propensity for understanding rather than condemnation. Further advantages of empowering local communities to lead peacebuilding initiatives are well detailed in a report by Conciliation Resources and Saferworld, named 'People's Peacemaking Perspectives', which found that more thorough conflict analysis illuminated numerous community responses which may have otherwise been neglected and could be essential to any effective project. These include the constructive attitudes to peaceful solutions held by young people, feelings of powerlessness that can be addressed to strengthen community capacities to conflict, and the clarification of sources of mistrust between communities which may be simply resolved.⁷⁵

In addition, locally based peace-building largely balances out a key disadvantage of third-party intervention; by working and training local leaders and communities, international peace-builders eventually cease to be necessary for the continuation of the PBI. Local people are likely to uphold the capacities they have inherited as these directly affect their own communities and families. This is particularly important in terms of resources and logistics: should peacebuilding organisations have to withdraw for such reasons, local communities are likely to remain committed to the PBI as the ramifications contribute directly to their lives, thereby supporting the durability and sustainability of such initiatives, whilst perhaps also decreasing the cost.

A significant advantage of local and particularly cross-border approaches to peacebuilding is that it enables organisations to fulfil certain roles which governments and state militaries cannot address due to matters of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, or are unwilling to or unaware of due to geographical proximity. State approaches are often directed towards the interests of individual states and often neglect the impact their actions have on neighbouring states, as seen in the Ugandan government's conflict with the LRA. Additionally, bordering regions are often situated far from the political capitals, they may be dismissed by governments and left to defend themselves and formulate their own solutions. A report by Conciliation Resources, named 'Paix Sans Frontières', indicates that more effective border management, often through greater cross-border community relations, can balance out the disparity between state-building and peacebuilding; as in many cases consolidation of the state leads to the marginalisation of border communities.⁷⁶

The advantages of non-military security solutions also highlight the differences in terms of what civilian-based and

75 Saferworld and Conciliation Resources (March 2012) 'From conflict analysis to peacebuilding impact: Lessons from People's Peacemaking Perspectives project', accessed at: http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/PPP_conflict_analysis_peacebuilding_impact.pdf

76 Ramsbotham, Alexander and Zartmen, William (Eds.) (2011) 'Accord 22: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, Paix Sans Frontières: building peace across borders', Conciliation Resources

civilian led initiatives are able to achieve, or are better prepared for, than those which are military-led. For example, **community reintegration must be dealt with on a civilian basis**; it cannot be imposed on a community or on a former combatant, nor can it be enforced militarily as the very basis of it is concerned with community confidence, reconciliation and trust. While the military may engage in many peacebuilding activities, either during or after conflict, there are likely to be limitations to what a foreign or even a state or national military intervention can achieve. Although, for some, an armed presence may contribute to the perceived security of the environment, there is an instinctive rationale for many peacebuilding initiatives, whether NGO or government-led, to pursue disarmament and demobilization prior to reintegration. The perception of arms and armed personnel is often an inhibiting factor to the ability of communities to move forward and has been a key challenge for many peacebuilding organisations working along the Sudanese border, who have been greatly hampered in their attempts to fulfill DDR initiatives because the reintegration relies so substantially on the assurances that combatants on all sides have been disarmed and demobilized. This makes any attempt to enforce DDR militarily somewhat destabilizing in itself as it increases perceptions of vulnerability and tension within and amongst communities. It has proven equally difficult even for UN peacekeeping operations, let alone for such actions to be undertaken by militaries or armed groups which were previously involved in the conflict itself.

Impact

Measuring impact and the sustainability of results remains difficult to standardize or to evaluate accurately; as mentioned in the initial section of this report, the subjectivity and often the fragility of conflict environments can make effectiveness hard to gauge. As noted by **Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)**, given the long-term aims of PBIs, measuring impact requires a combination of a results-orientated and process-orientated approach, as the essential aim of any project is to 'focus on ending something destructive and build something desired at the time'.⁷⁷ Therefore, assessing the effect of such projects contrasts significantly with the mainstream approach of focusing on specific and often quantifiable results.

While numerous organisations such as GPPAC have produced detailed and insightful reports of how to assess and evaluate progress, these remain somewhat ambiguous. For example, one recommendation for evaluating the success of a project is to state whether the objectives of the project have been achieved,⁷⁸ something which - while a useful point of reference - does not provide any succinct criteria for assessing the 'achievement' of objectives, which is essentially likely to lie with the programme developers and their vision for the project at hand.

Given the difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of PBIs, the expertise and experience of those developing the programmes becomes essential. This point is perhaps a key source of weakness for projects undertaken by the British government, as the National Audit Office Review of the Conflict Pool 2012 commented that:

'Most staff we spoke to **did not have training or experience in monitoring and evaluation**, or receive central guidance on what is expected. Many projects are also too low in value to justify external evaluation ... there is a common culture of believing that measuring outcomes is "too difficult". This had led to **predominance of stating outputs rather than outcomes, with "too early to say" often reported**'.⁷⁹

Such statements should provoke concern, as a body such as the government which has access to some of the greatest sources of funding for PBI and such considerable influence, appears to have little expertise or experience in assessing the efficacy of the projects it implements. This in turn is likely to lead to the continuation of less effective projects and also to the allocation of funds based on the apparent merit of a project proposal, rather than on the realities or long-term utility of it.

77 Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) (May 2008) 'Assessing Progress on the Road to Peace: Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities', Issue Paper 5, p. 54, accessed at: http://www.gppac.net/issue-papers/-/document_library/view/0/4939?_20_redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gppac.net%2Fissue-papers%3Fp_p_id%3D20%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-1%26p_p_col_count%3D1 [Hereafter referred to as GPPAC (2008)]

78 GPPAC (2008), p.16

79 NAO 2012, p. 22 (Art. 4.2)



conclusions

As described above, the key advantages of localised non-military security solutions are:

- Effectiveness
- Longevity
- Adaptability to local perspectives
- Sustainability through local leadership
- Transformational capacity

Essentially, non-military-based security solutions allow both international and local participants to conduct and design PBIs which are formulated to suit specific contexts and specific populations. A significant contribution of non-military security solutions is that they provide the conditions of security which are actually undermined by military presence, belligerent or otherwise; by providing conflict-affected communities with the capacities and skills to build confidence, facilitate reconciliation, and ultimately to **transform conflicts through civilian means, rather than to simply end them through military force**.

Although international and third party participation is encouraged and in many cases may be vital, external organisations and approaches must ensure they comply with the necessary characteristics listed above to ensure effectiveness and to avoid exacerbating already sensitive situations. The regulations provided by CARE, International Alert, GPPAC and numerous other British organisations which dedicate themselves to conducting effective peacebuilding operations overseas are likely to be extremely helpful in aiding with the development of any locally based peacebuilding project. Their contributions to British peacebuilding have characterised many of the conclusions of this analysis, which I am pleased to say have been able sufficiently to display the innovation and positive outcomes of British initiatives.

There is significant evidence that the UK government has full understanding and appreciation of the viability and advantages of PBIs and works closely with British organisations such as Saferworld to coordinate its peacebuilding strategies, as seen in its adoption of upstream prevention.⁸⁰ Government PBIs indicated in the case studies and its commitments laid out in reports such as 'Building Stability Overseas'⁸¹ emphasise **the strategic convergence between the British government and non-governmental organisations**. However, this ultimately leads to questions concerning the diminutive resources and expertise allocated to the Conflict Pool and similar conflict-prevention funding mechanisms. After noting that 'our security and prosperity is intertwined with peaceful development and security across the globe', why then has the British government invested so disproportionately in defence rather than in consolidating the 'peaceful development and security' which it claims is so pertinent?⁸²

This point is particularly troubling considering that the disparity between declared and actual commitments has been observed in previous government evaluations. For example, DfID's 2003 Review of the UK Peacebuilding Approach⁸³ noted that, although DfID's Country Strategy Papers widely noted the destructive effects of conflict, the subsequent development goals largely ignored the role that the UK could play in limiting those effects: 'The papers read as if peacebuilding is either over or no longer relevant to the UK'.⁸⁴ This comment strongly reflects current issues, as the government has publicly declared its commitment to peacebuilding initiatives, designed policy and attributed funds to projects, yet it struggles to actually implement them appropriately.

In light of this, further research is therefore required to investigate how the UK approach to peacebuilding has improved and how much must still be done. Using the findings from past reports such as the 2003 Review of UK Strategy on Peacebuilding would be a strong starting point as it recommends areas in which the government needs to improve most; this can be seen in detail in Appendix 2. This, alongside other evaluations and the annual reports of the Conflict Pool and National Audit Office Reviews, would greatly facilitate such work. Additionally, investigation into

80 BSOS (2011)

81 BSOS (2011)

82 BSOS (2011)

83 Lawry-White, Simon (2003) 'Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding Part 1: Review of UK government approach to peacebuilding', *UK Department for International Development*

84 Lawry-White, Simon (2003) 'Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding Part 1: Review of UK government approach to peacebuilding', *UK Department for International Development*. p. 41 (Art. 6.1)

how Conflict Pool resources are allocated to the DfID, MoD and FCO is also important, particularly in relation to the proportion of funds provided for peacekeeping operations and to the question as to how the Conflict Pool may actually be used as a system of subsidies for the MoD rather than for conflict prevention. The structure of decision-making should also be analysed in order to elucidate whether the criteria used for allocating funds to peace-building projects is distorted and to show up ways in which the evaluative apparatus of these projects can be improved.

Comparative studies should also be conducted between British approaches to military and conflict prevention spending and the approach taken by other European countries. Research should focus on how other European countries allocate resources for defence and PBIs, how allocation is decided, on what basis and how the PBIs themselves are designed and evaluated. Reports such as the Joint Utstein Study of Peacekeeping will be useful to analyse differences in European governmental approaches to peacebuilding as well as to investigate how they may alter depending on the administration.⁸⁵ This would provide insight into the attitudes and methods of other governments and could provide a foundation for alternatives that the government could adopt.

Finally, as indicated by this report, the relationship the government maintains with peacebuilding organisations is likely to be a significant indicator of its commitments. While the British government appears to maintain solid ties with British NGOs and has aligned many areas of its policies and peace-building projects with the guidelines and strategies detailed by such organisations, further investigation into the relationship should be carried out in order to uncover the power and persuasive capacities of British NGOs in shaping and enforcing the government's policies and commitments.

In essence, this report emphasizes the key advantages to the use of non-military security solutions in conflict-affected areas. While these advantages may not be directly quantifiable and impact remains hard to measure definitively, the positive contribution that PBIs have provided to conflict-affected regions and communities is highly indicative of their efficacy. This has been recognized and incorporated into the thinking of British NGOs as well as the British government itself, indicating the profound expertise of British peacebuilding and also provoking queries of the government's commitment to military and defence in light of its open acceptance of the fact that security is essentially consolidated through peace.

⁸⁵ Lawry-White, Simon (2003)'Review of the UK government approach to peacebuilding and synthesis of lessons learned from UK government funded peacebuilding projects 1997-2001: Contribution to the Joint Ustein Study of Peacebuilding', *UK Department for International Development*.

Appendix I: UK Peacebuilding Organisations

Organisation	Website	Email	Location
CARE	http://www.careinternational.org.uk/	On site	London
Conciliation Resources	http://www.c-r.org/	cr@c-r.org	London
Concordis International	http://www.concordis-international.org/home.html	office@concordis-international.org	Cambridge
Cord	http://www.cord.org.uk/	info@cord.org.uk	Leamington Spa
Glencree	http://www.glencree.ie/index.html	info@glencree.ie	Enniskerry, Ireland
International Alert	http://www.international-alert.org/	general@international-alert.org	London
Oxfam	http://www.oxfam.org/en	enquiries@oxfam.org.uk	Oxford
Peacebuilding UK	http://peacebuildinguk.org/	info@peacebuildinguk.org	Cornwall
PEACE DIRECT	http://www.peacedirect.org/	info@peacedirect.org	London
Saferworld	http://www.saferworld.org.uk/	general@saferworld.org.uk	London
World Vision	http://www.worldvision.org.uk/	info@worldvision.org.uk	Milton Keynes



conscience

TAXES FOR PEACE NOT WAR

we work for a world where taxes are used to nurture peace not pay for war

conscience campaigns for a progressive increase in the amount of UK tax spent on peacebuilding, and a corresponding decrease in the amount spent on war and the preparation for war. In addition, we advocate the use of non-military security and provide information and resources to support the development of peacebuilding and conflict prevention methods - methods that are widely recognised to provide more effective and better value forms of security than military intervention.

We also campaign for an update in the law, so that people with a conscientious objection to war can have the part of their taxes currently spent on war and its preparations – approximately 6% – spent on peacebuilding and conflict prevention instead. This is in recognition of the fact that although we no longer face military conscription in the UK, we continue to bear a moral responsibility for war through our taxation contribution to the Ministry of Defence.

This report contributes to the debate about peacebuilding and non-military security solutions and its aim is not to provide solutions that should be followed ardently by government, but rather to help foster debate about what could and should be done in response to conflict. Public debate about solutions to ending and preventing conflict is important as it helps us – and more importantly our political leaders – to remember that should be actively looking for solutions to conflict that bring about real peace.

If you have any comments or suggestions you would like to raise in response to this report please contact **conscience**: TAXES FOR PEACE NOT WAR at info@conscienceonline.org.uk or for more information about the campaign please visit our website: www.conscienceonline.org.uk

This work has been carried out by a volunteer for **conscience**. However, the findings, views and recommendations contained in the research are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of **conscience**. **conscience** is not responsible for the contents of this research.